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PREFACE 
The investigation into the subject matter of this thesis began 
in June, 1970. Since that time an attempt has been made to try and 
gather as much information as possible in order to give this study a 
representative outlook. Yet, from the outset, a few obstacles have 
been encountered which have formed a barrier precluding the examination 
of some material. 
It is regretted that the film ''Why Vietnam?" could not be obtained 
for· examination. This film was made by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
in 1965. With the help of Ltc. John Rodo~ph of the Oklahoma State 
University Department of Military Science, it was traced from Ft. Sill, 
Oklahoma to Toby Hana Arsenal, Pennsylvania, to find that the only 
remaining copy is on record in the National Archives in Washington, 
o.c., and cannot be released for viewing. 
Telegrams were sent to selected war correspondents asking for 
telephone interviews. The only individual to consent was Brig. Gen. 
s. L. A. Marshall (U.S. Army, Ret. ), a former war reporter, author 
(~ Chop Hill), and perhaps the most knowledgeable military historian 
living today. As a former Army officer myself, I would like to extend 
my appreciation for his time and frank expression of opinions about 
war correspondents. 
Rarely is anything the work of one person. And this thesis is 
no exception. Many have contributed a part of themselves both in a 
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direct and an indirect manner. To them I raise my glass with the 
hope that in the future I may give back in multiple what I have re-
ceived: to Dr. Harry Heath, Director of the School of Journalism and 
Broadcasting, Oklahoma State University, whose keen insight, and love 
of journalism has taught me the importance of detail and credibility 
in the profession; to my wife Barbara and my sons John and Matthew 
who, knowingly and unknowingly, sacrificed their time for mine and 
gave far more of themselves than I had the right to ask; and to my 
parents, Mr. and Mrs. Joe s. Williams, Jr., who taught me the value 
of a tear and a smile. 
In the preparation of this thesis I have learned a great deal. 
However, in retrospect, the line separating enlightenment and confusion 
still looms very broad. To the correspondents who have gone before 
and to the Vietnamese who must go ahead: 
A carpet lay on a 
Road traveled by many, 
An.d when evening came 
It was grey and dusty 
Like the road. 
Thereupon I said unto my 
soul: 
This is thy parable, 
O soul, when thou 
Endurest patiently the 
Market and the 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Post-World War II Background: A Brief Overview. • • 1 
Framework for the Study •• o • o •• o ••••• o 2 
Method of Procedure •••••• o • • • • • • • • • 4 
THE EARLY YEARS 1951-1960. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 5 
THE UNREPORTED WAR: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT AND 
THE MILlTARY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• • • • • • • 8 
The Press Corps Forms: Trouble from the Start. • • 8 
THE GAP WIOENS---1964-1971 o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 
Army Information: Free or Closed? • • • • • • • • • 19 
The "Five O'Clock Follies". • • • • • • • • • • • • 21 
Marshall's Criticism •••••••• o • • • • • • • 23 
The Impact of Pictures. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 
Salisbury: Dateline Hanoi. • • • • • • • • • • • • 25 
Press Corps Dissent •••••••••• o •••• o 26 
Age Old Conflict: Censorship. • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Correspondent Buspended o • • • • • • • • • • • • • 28 
Censorship and the American Serviceman ••• • • • • 30 
Distortions· •••• • • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • 32 
The Investigations of My Lai 4 ••••• o ••• o o 33 
BAO CHI. ..... • ........ . e 8 e O e e O e e e 37 
Covering Wars: Yesterday and Today ••• o •• • • • 37 
The Correspondents View Their Work •• • • • • • • • 40 
The Female Correspondents • • • • • • • • • • • • • 45 
CAMBODIA: THE FREE-FOR-ALL e e O O • 0 0 e O e e e e e 8 
TELEVISION CORRESPONOENTS. 
••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Summary ••••••••• 
Conclusions ••••••• 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • 
v 
• • • • • • • • • 0 • • • 
• • • • • • • • 0 • • • • 









Never in the history of warfare has so much information been 
available to so many. At the peak of the combat, more than 400 corres-
pondents in Vietnam turned out copy regularly for the ~ss media. It 
should not be surprising, then, that their output has seemed overwhelming 
on occasion, amplified as it has been by television, radio, and press 
into a cacophony of observations, opinions and official-but-sometimes-
misleading statistics. 
In the midst of this information explosion many people have had 
the feeling that they have not been getting the "true picture" of 
Vietnam.(Arlen, 1967). 
Post-World War II Background: A Brief Overview 
A study of the war correspondent in Vietnam would be lacking wtth-
out a general political background to set the tone· of events in this 
much-troubled country. 
Ho Chi Minh, hero to some and villa:iin to others, proclaimed a 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam at Hanoi in 1945, in the wake of the 
Japanese surrender as World War II was concluded. But by 1946, the 
French had returned to Saigon and were engaged in hostilities with 
Ho's Viet Minh. In 1948, ex-emperor Bao Dai was installed as chief of 
state in Saigon by the French, who then obtained substantial financial 
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aid from the United States in 1950 at the time of the Korean crisis. 
The G~neva agreements of 1954 ended hostilities and provided for 
a partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel with reunification 
through elections to follow in 1956. The Bao Dai government did not 
accept the agreement or honor it; the United States created the SEATO 
alliance and included South Vietnam in the protected areas. 
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Premier Ngo Dinh Diem ousted Bao Dai, refused to allow the elections 
and obtained the help of the United States Military Assistance Advisory 
Group to train his army beginning in 1955. His opposition in South 
Vietnam formed the National Liberation Front and its guerrilla force, 
the Viet Cong. 
By 1960 there were 686 u.s. military advisers in South Vietnam, a 
figure raised to 3,000 at the close of President Kennedy's first year in 
office (1961) as insurgency grew. Diem, his sister-in-law Mme. Nhu, 
and the ruling Catholic party became increasingly oppressive, The 
Buddhist uprisings of 1963 in Saigon and Hue, and the countryside 
insurgency, brought a November coup and the death of Diem. 
The American advisory group, now a u.s. Military Assistance Command 
with 16,300 men, took over military affairs as 10 Saigon governments 
came and went in the next 18 months. In the United States, a new 
President was entering the White House just three weeks after the 
Saigon coup. 
Framework for the Study 
The Vietnam W1;1.r has been termed "tlie best reported and least under-
stood in history ••• " (Friendly, 1970). It is the longest war in u.s. 
history. In this century only World War II has cost this nation more 
casualties. The tonnage of bombs dropped in Vietnam (North and South) 
exceeds that in Europe in World War II. Costs have mounted into the 
scores of billions of dollars. 
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It is within this framework that certain questions arise pertaining 
to the war correspondent in Vietnam: Have the U.S. correspondents 
described and explained the war? What were the procedures employed by 
the correspondents in reporting the war? What problems did they en-
counter? What were their relationships with the United States and 
Saigon governments and with u.s. military leaders? These questions are 
fundamental to the study of the war correspondent in Vietnam. 
For the past 12 years Saigon has been the most important---and most 
difficult---dateline in the world. This undeclared war with far less 
than total backing at home is a curiously frustrating and unsatisfactory 
assignment. It is more than a military struggle. It also has other 
strategically important facets: political, dip'lomatic, economic and 
cultural. And, to complicate matter.s further, Asian values are vastly 
different from American values •.. Correspondents faced with reporting 
such a diversified war encounter numerous obstacles. And, in the end 
they are judged by their actions, their degree of understanding in 
conveying these complex segments, and their effectiveness in trans-
lating them to the American public. Rarely considered by critics is 
the degree to which media consumers apply themselves to a search for 
real understanding. 
The members of the Vietnam-based American press corps play an 
extremely significant role in shaping public opinion about the war. 
What they report as well as what they fail to report can be the differ-
ence between a well-informed and knowledgeable populace and one that 
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is conflict-ridden and confused, 
This study is concerned with the war correspondent and his position 
in Vietnam. It seeks to examine the role of the correspondent and to 
identify the problems encountered as well as the procedures employed 
in reporting the war. These problems cover a wide array of subjects. 
It is important to keep in mind that they are not independent, but are 
intrinsically related to each other, as they have been throughout the 
course of the war. 
Method of Procedure 
This study will attempt to synthesize selected books, articles, 
periodicals and other source material (i.e., a personal interview with 
Brig. Gen. s. L.A. Marshall, a television special and various news-
papers and theses) pertaining to the nature of Vietnam War correspon-
dence. 
A review of literature on this subject (see bibliography) indi-
cated that other theses have dealt primarily with different facets 
of war correspondence and do not direct attention entirely to the 
problems and procedures of reporting the Vietnam War. The few studies 
that have been prepared, for example are concerned with such subjects 
as cold war censorship; comparisons between World War II, Korea and 
Vietnam coverage; public information officers and their work; news 
sou~ces in Vietnam; and content analysis of various correspondents• 
works. 
Due to the importance of war reporting and the lack of information 
on Vietnam correspondents, a study of this nature is needed. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EARLY YEARS 1951-60 
"One of the perplexing things about the war in Indochina is that 
a correspondent never knows whether he is safer at the front or at the 
' rear'' (Durdin 1966). If specific mention of Indochina had not been made, 
this quotation might aptly have applied to correspondents in Korea or 
World War II~ This remark was made in 1951 by one of the first American 
correspondents in Vietnam, when the French were trying to contain their 
colonial stronghold in Indochina. 
During these early years, the correspondents primarily were con-
cerned with being in the right place at the right time•••and escaping 
the methodical Vietminh terrorists• grenades that were connnonplace 
throughout Hanoi, which then served as connnand post for the French and 
home base for war correspondents. 
The battle lines were more easily defined in those days, enabling 
the correspondent to jeep to the front in the morning and return in the 
evening "to a dinner of onion soup, grilled pigeon, chocolate·souffle, 
and champagne." (Durdin 1966) 
After the signing of the Korean armistice in the sunnner of 1953, 
the American press turned its attention to the long•ignored conflict in 
Indochina. It relied principally upon'. o.rie basic ·.source:. the French 
army connnuniques which were relayed to Paris by the Agence France Presse 
(AFP, French wire service). With their desire for economy, American 
5 
6 
media relied on AFP rather than on staff correspondents in Hanoi to 
write the few daily war stories that were relayed by Associated Press, 
United Press and International News Service. 
The French journalists and the few American free lance correspon• 
dents in Hanoi were limited in verbiage each week due to the expensive 
cable tolls. To some critics, their main purpose appeared to be that 
of providing enthusiastic stories with a byline and the magical dateline 
---Hanoi. Otto Friedrich (1959) provides this insight: 
When I was transferred to the Paris bureau. that sununer 
of 1953, I was only partly aware of how the war was 
being covered, and my first stor.ies reflected the 
drabness of the French corilmuniques ••• But I was soon 
taken aside by the assis·tant bureau chief ••• TJ:iere was 
no point in even writing a story that just reported 
what was happening, he said, because such things.usually 
ended on some editor's dead~spike. That verdict, I soon 
learned, was perfectly right. The story that got into 
the papers--and getting into papers was our reason for 
existence--was the one that showed "enthusiasm." 
Friedrich defined "enthusiasm" as writing about something_as 
though it were exciting even though one had no knowledge of it, or 
whether anything exciting was happening. Enthusiastic writing of this 
type relied on more than the usual adjectives and action verbs. 
The AFP bureau in Paris sent an average of three stories per day 
to the United States. When the French army opened an offensive, the 
number would increase to six battle stories a day. But during a lull, 
the Paris bureau, with no incoming reports from Indochina, continued to 
file battle stories to the unknowing u.s. editors. Thus, it was not 
unusual for the bureau editors to create a false battle in which the 
French army---in "battlefront reports filtering through heavy cencor-
ship"•••would be described as conquering heroes who ''splash through the 
raging torrents in hot pursuit of the fleeing Reds." (Friedrich, 1959) 
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.But why did the war correspondents and bureau editors of the AFP 
in Paris knowingly create these fantasies? One reason was that in 
1953-54 the French officials did not subscribe to the philosophy that 
the public has a right to information and that the press should be 
separate from the government in order to represent the people. Instead, 
the officials had a policy of witholding news that would jeopardize 
their image. It was roughly a policy of "what the public doesn't know 
won't hurt them." (Friedrich, 1959) 
At the other extreme, however, was the French Army's desire for 
publicity. And the war correspondents in Indochina---both French and 
American---were given press releases of turbulent offenses and hard-
fought victories. If the French lost a village or town it was described 
as being "of no strategic value," but if they recaptured the same area 
it was played up as having "considerable prestige value." (Friedrich, 
1959) 
The war correspondent in Indochina-.. •living the relativ~ly good life 
of French colonialism before Dienbienphu---was the tool through which 
these apparent lies and denials were transmitted. American editors 
relied upon the wire services, and not their own reporters, to get the 
news. Because of the limited American manpower connnitment, editors did 
not send their own personnel to Indochina. The expense involved in 
maintaining a correspondent some 8,000 miles away simply was thought to 
be too great. However, one year before, in June of 1952, the United 
States was contributing one-third of the cost of the war to the French 
and was becoming increasingly involved financially and politically. 
CHAPTER III 
THE UNREPORTED WAR: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT 
AND THE MILITARY 
The Press Corps Forms: Trouble from the Start 
The stage was set in 1961. President Kennedy, acting on the 
advice of General Maxwell Do Taylor's fact-finding mission to Vietnam, 
increased American military forces f~om 600 to 16,000. As the American 
mission did an about-face from an advisory role to a combat posture, 
the importance of this small Asian country and the American troop commit-
ment quite naturally increased in the eyes of the UoS• editors. News-
papers and magazines began to take a more active interest in what was 
then termed the "Vietnam conflicto 11 
American correspondents in Vietnam between 1961 and 1964 approached 
their jobs much as they had in the United States or elsewhereo The 
majority seemed to have perceived that their duty was "to report the 
news, whether or not the news was good for America." (Halberstam, 1965)0 
The ambassadors and military officials, however, looked upon this kind 
of reporting as defeatist and irresponsible crusading. 
Leading the correspondents' "crusade" were Malcolm Browne, who came 
to Vietnam in November of 1961 for the Associated Press; Neil Sheehan, 
who arrived in April, 1962, for United Press International; and David 
Halberstam, who joined them in May for the New York Times. Among 
others who appeared in 1962 were Horst Faas, photographer, and 
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Peter Arnett for the Associated Press; Peter Kalischer, CBS; Charles 
Mohr, Time; Beverly Deepe, Newsweek, who later joined ~he Christian 
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Science Monitor~ and Francois Sully, who had covered Dienbienphu and 
stayed on for Newsweek. 
These correspondents were the first to report unfavorable news 
about the progress of the war, the weakness of the Diem goverrunent, and 
the inability of the U.S. government to achieve what it had set out to 
do: 1 "•••win the hearts and minds of the peopleo" Their reports were 
in conflict with official statements from military and political 
leaders sent from Washington on a variety of fact-finding missionso 
When Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam viewed a military debacle 
at Ap Boe in January, 1963, they reported it as a failure of South 
Vietnamese arms, proving that u.s. military advisers had a long way to 
go to instill a winning spirit in their allies. And when the u.s. 
command described the battle as a victory, the undermining of the 
Vietnam-based press corps' reputation had commenced (Mi~or, 1970). 
The primary reason for this journalistic~political-military tug-
of-war in the early 1960s, stemmed from the correspondents• relentless 
questioning and investigating of the Diem government and the degree to 
which the United States supported it. In essence, when the u.s. 
administration publicly applauded the domestic policies of Diem, the 
press denounced and criticized them; when American military officials 
spoke of the war as being won, the correspondents stated that the war 
w~s not being won, only lost more slowly. To this was added the initial 
fear of u.s. correspondents by the Diem government, which looked upon 
the Western reporters as being largely responsible for Saigon's problems. 
As a result, Diem badgered, harrassed, intimidated, censored, and on 
10 
occasion expelled unfriendly correspa,rldents? 
The most important expulsion case occurred in September, 1962, 
when Newsweek reporter Francois Sully (a French national who had lived 
in Indoehi:na for 17 years) was ousted by the Diem regime for his blunt 
reports on the government's dwindling support and the ineffectual war 
against the Viet Cong. 3 
Equally important to Sully's expulsion was the reaction of the 
American officials. Because of Sully's consistent "doomsday attitude" 
on the war, he had caused trouble for the American mission. As a 
result, the American officials were "not in the least unhappy to see 
him go" (Halberstam, 1965 ). 
The relationship between the American mission and the American press 
in Vietnam thus began on an abrasive foundation. The correspondents, 
upset by the treatment of Sully yet still confident in their own 
purpose as reporters, were continually apprehensive and suspicious not 
only of the actions of the military and the American administration, 
but of the Saigon government as well. At the same time, the Diem 
government and the American mission in Vietnam wereequally suspicious 
of the correspondents. 
In order to understanp some of the reasons behind the feuding, one 
must look more closely at the conditions which prevaiiLed. By 1964, 
three years after the Kennedy troop build-up, there were only 13 
employed correspondents working for United States news media in South 
Vietnam. There were only 60 correspondents in all of Vietnam. For the 
most part, the correspondents were young, agile, adventuresome and 
largely unable to speak Vietnamese without the aid of an interpreter 
(although some could speak French, the country's second language). As 
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with any small group engaged in similar work many miles from home, the 
correspondents tended to be drawn together in both their work and their 
social life. One theory is that the correspondents were too close: 
They work hard and go their separate ways on separate 
assignments. But when they meet and unwind••in the field, 
in their homes or in the ·camaraderie of the Hotel Cara-
velle's eighth-floor bar-·they pool their convictions, 
information and grievances. But the balm of such compan-
ionship has not been conductive to independent thought. 
The reporters have tended to reach unanimous agreement 
on almost everything they have seeno But such agreement 
is suspect because it is so obviously inbred. The news-
men have themselves become a part of South Vietnam's con-
fusion; they have covered a complex situation from only 
one angle, as if their iwn conclusions offered all the 
necessary illumination. 
As Buddhists set themselves afire and the pressures against the 
Diem government increased, the Saigon correspondents also found a new 
wave of convlict and agitation---within its own ranks. Stopping off 
in Saigon for periodic visits were syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop; 
Marguerite Higgins of the ;New Yor~ llerald Tribune, and Keyes Beech of 
the Chicago Daily~· Veterans of World War II and the Korean War 
press corps, these journalists were typified by their acceptance of the 
war as a necessary fact of life; they ·certainly were not activists pro• 
t 
bing into the humaness of military tactics and government policy. 
Higgins was an avowed "hawk" who had advocated the use of the atomic 
bomb if needed to repel the communists wherever they were.(Emory, 1971). 
David Halberstam, a Pulitzer Prize winner, and other newsmen were 
criticized by Alsop as being "young crusaders" who generally were 
accurate in their reporting but were responsible for the near psychotic 
state of mind among the inhabitants of Gailang Palace. Higgins 
prophesied that "reporters here would like to see us lose the war to 
prove they are right" (Halberstam, 1965). (Marguerite Higgins later 
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fell victim to an Asian infection from a 1965 trip and died a lingering 
death in 1966.) 
The attacks mounted in 1963. The correspondents had repelled 
State Department press guidance by Carl T. Rowan in 1962 ("Newsmen 
should be advised that trifling or thoughtless criticism of the Diem 
government would make it difficult to maintain cooperation between the 
United States and Diem.") only to find in 1963 that Diem's police force 
would beat them over their heads and smash their cameras for covering 
a demonstration (Browne, 1964). 
Aside from the criticism being echoed both by the administration 
and the correspondents, the pot boiled over in 1963 when~ magazine 
killed a pessimistic story filed from Saigon. 
Charles Mohr, then Time's chief correspondent in Southeast Asia, 
and his colleague, Mert Perry, were asked by Time to do a wrap-up on 
the state of the war. The article began: "The war in Vietnam is being 
lost.If The story, stressing the failure of American foreign policy in 
Vietnam, was not what the editors wanted to hear. They dropped the 
story and printed an optimistic piece that assured the public that 
"government troops are fighting better than ever'~ (Halberstam, 1965 ). 
According to Stanley Karnow (Mohr's predecessor as Time bureau chief 
in Southeast Asia), Otto Fuerbringer, managing editor of Time then wrote 
-·· 
an article for the magazine's Press Section with nothing but his own 
preconceptions to guide him. Karnow termed the article "a devastating 
compendium of bitter innuendo and clever generalities, all blatantly 
impeaching American correspondents in Vietnam for distorting the news" 
(Halberstam, 1965). 
In effect, tt hinted that the war was going better than one would 
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assume from the small clique of reporters who spent more time inter-
viewing each other in the Caravelle Bar than they did in the field. 
The article not only seemed to indict other correspondents in Vietnam, 
but two of ~'sown. As a result, both Charles Mohr and Mert Perry 
resigned. 
Three years later, in 1966, when questioned on a National Education-
al Television program as to whether his material was t>.;eing intelligently 
edited, Charles Mohr (then with the New: York. Times) replied: 
I think, on the whole, the executives in the American 
press have, in the face of considerable threat and 
cajolery by public officials, stuck by their men out 
here (Vietnam). David Halberstam, who served here 
for the _New Y.ork. Times, was once asked what it took 
to cover a difficult story like this, what was the 
main quality a reporter needed; and he said a 
tough publishero 5 
Also taking part in the NET broadcast was Mala:olm Browne, one of 
the pioneers in the early 1960s with David Halberstam. His connnents 
about the United States editors were sharp: 
ooohaving worked for a number of news organizations ••• 
I would say that editors and news directors and so 
forth at the desk level back in the States are very 
little above the ave~age level of information than 
the rest of the American public. That is to say, they 
know practically nothing about Vietnam~ 6 
However, the correspondents themselves were severE!ly criticized 
in an official mission white paper, prepared in January, 1963, for 
General Earl Wheeler, former Chief of Staff of the Army. The paper 
said, "The American connnitment has been badly hampered by irresponsible, 
astigmatic and sensationalized reporting" (Halberstam, 1965 ). 
And still further, in 1964, Arthur Sylvester, then Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, spoke to newsmen about the 
press•Pentagon conflict. He stated, in effect, that American 
14 
correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that 
made the United States look good. A network television correspondent 
said, "Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be hand• 
maidens of the government." 
"That's exactly what I expect," he replied (Safer, 1966). 
David Halberstam relates that the criticism went even higher up the 
ladder: 
The Kennedy administration--embarrassed by what was 
beginning to look like a major foreign policy failure, 
and apgered by its ineptitude in_allowing the pagoda 
crackdown to take place, in not having diagnosed it 
correctly when it did take place, and in not having any 
answer when it finally did analyze the situation correct• 
ly--took to attacking our reporting as inaccurate, the 
work of a handful of emotional and inexperienced young 
men• In addition, the President's press secretary, 
Pierre Salinger, and other White House staff members 
more interested in their chief's political status than 
the war in Vietnam, would knowingly inform White House 
reporters that we in Vietnam never went on operations 
(Halberstam, 1965). 
The credibility gap that developed with the advent of American 
combat troops in Vietnam was one of differences between official 
statements, the war correspondents• reporting, and the extent to which 
they both were believed by the public. To many readers of the American 
press, the printed word is the truth. When the printed word is official, 
their convictions are reinforced. However, when the government was 
initially being attacked and doubted by the correspondents in 1961-64, 
the foundation was laid for what was to be seen later as a crumbling in 
credibility, not only within the government but the press as well. 
The late Dro Bernard B. Fall~(1968), an astute observer of many 
years in Asia who died doing his own research in Vietnam, offers a 
statement from former Embassy official (1962-64) John Mecklin that, 
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according to Fall, is an explanation that covers the period of French 
presence as well as the early 1960s: 
The root of the problem was the fact that much of 
what the newsmen took to be lies was exactly what 
the United States Mission genuinely believed, and 
was reporting to Washington. Events were to prove 
that the Mission itself was unaware of how badly the 
war was going, operating in a world of illusion. 
Our feud with the newsmen was an angry symptom of 
bureaucratic sickness. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Charles Mohr, "At Issue f/69: The Information War," National 
Educational Television Special (August 1, 1966). 
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3Ibid. 
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Egucational Television Special (August 1, 1966). 
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11; 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GAP WIDENS·--1964-1971 
The decision to ma,ke the war in Vietnam a major United States 
war came in August, 1964, when the administration claimed that two 
u.s. destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin had been attacked by 
North Vietnamese PT boats. President Johnson requested, and Congress 
quickly approved, a resolution giving him power to repel attacks and 
to prevent further aggression. It was the contention of Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk that an aggressor power was using force to achieve 
political goals; others contended that the war in Vietnam was a civil 
war, particularly with the actions involving the Viet Cong, guerrilla 
arm of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. The Tonkin Gulf 
"incident" seemed to foreclose the issue. 
At the time of the incident, 163 Americans had died in action in 
Vietnam, and the 16,000 American troops there as a result of the 
Taylor mission were serving more as advisers than combat soldiers. But 
within a year President Johnson had put to work the Congressionally 
approved "Tonkin Resolution." In the President's hands, the resolution 
became functionally equivalent to a declaration of war--0 one which 
ultimately saw more than half a million U.S. troops committed to Viet-
nam and more than 50,000 killed. 
What really happened the night of August 4, 1964, was unclear when 
Congress voted President Johnson a free hand in the war. What came to 
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the surface after stateside newsmen questioned the crew members of the 
u.s. ships Maddox and Turner Joy gave a much different picture of the 
incidents than the administration version which was initially trans-
mitted by the news media. (The Maddox, on an espionage mission, had 
violated territorial waters, and total damage in the "attacks" was one 
bullet hole in the Maddox.) The media did not investigate the 
administration~ s claims until it was too late (Stillman, 1970). 
When U.S. troops began pouring into South Vietnam (160,000 by the 
end of 1965) as a result of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the build-up 
of war correspondents moved apace. Over the previous five years, 
clashes between the press and the military-government had been increas-
ing in intensity. Now, with the growing media presence during the 
last half of the 1960s a more open criticism mushroomed. 
Government spokesmen responded by questioning not only the compe• 
tence and good judgement of reporters, but their patriotism as well. 
As a consequence, an undercurrent of doubt greeted much of the news 
from Vietnam. This crisis in credibility reached a peak between 1964 
and 1968. 
The problems that existed in the initial days of U.S. military 
involvement have changed only in degree of intensity to the present. 
It is a vicious circle. The press is accused of not supplying the 
people with the facts; the administration is attacked for trying to 
suppress information; the correspondents are treated as a nuisance; 
and the military is criticized for giving a false picture of the 
progress of the war. 
One of the major complications that surfaced in 1965 was the 
correspondents•realization that the war was, to the Vietnamese govern• 
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ment, still essentially a Vietnamese war. According to Frank McCulloch, 
Southeast Asia bureau chief for~ in 1965, the Vietnamese government 
felt that it had a right to some voice in the reporting of the war. 
That fact complicated matters for the USIS. Said McCulloch(l965): 
"Not only is there the problem of two conflicting governmental views; 
there is also a marked difference between American and Asian concepts 
of freedom of information." 
Army Information: Free or Closed? 
By 1969, the difficulties between the correspondents and the 
Army had mounted. Since the early days of the war, the press had 
been considered bothersome to the military, tolerated but rarely 
trusted. The cooperation that did take place was usually formal. 
Since the war in Vietnam had no well-identified battle Lines, many 
of the encounters were short lived and unknown to most but the militaryo 
Other operations were held secret until after the fact, unless detected 
by the press. Therefore, the correspondents were at least partially 
dependent on Army information channels for news. Figures on body counts, 
skirmishes, sorties, bombs dropped, raids and lost planes were compiled 
exclusively by the Military Office of Informationo 
The Vietnam press corps generally considered the Army's information 
open to question. Objective reporting by public information personnel 
may often bend to the desire of one's military superiorso The Army had 
its own doubts. It claimed that the press sought big news even at the 
cost of "abetting the enemy and prolonging the war" (Fox, 1969). 
During the April 1972 North Vietnamese offensive, about 100 American 
soldiers balked when ordered to move through what they considered to 
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be a booby trapped area. Lt·c, Frederick P. Mitchell, ~t.he~.Qijttalion ·. 
commander, said: "All you press are bastards---! blame you for this and · 
you can quote me on it." The press responded that only objective repor~·. 
1 ting can justify the correspondent's role in the war. 
In 1969, the first unified action taken by the press corps saw 11 
bureau chiefs (representing the three major television networks, the 
New York Daily News, Visnews, UPI, Metromedia, the Scripps-Howard 
Alliance, Westinghouse Broadcasting Corporation, National Catholic 
News Service and the British Broadcasting Corporation) send a letter 
of protest to Col. Gorden Hill, chief of the Military Assitance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) Office of Information in Vietnam. The letter 
complained about the lack of pertinent information on U.S. military 
activities and charged the Military Assistance Command, Office of 
Information (MACOI), with attempting to suppress news by the use of 
evasion, refusal to comment without explanation, and refusal to answer 
legitimate questions (Fox, 1969). 
The letter detailed ten examples from a list of 50 incidents of 
managed news. One example follows: 
Recently, enemy forces launched an assault against· 
what an official MACOI communique and spokesmen 
called a "night defensive position.1• Newsmen 
recognized the location as, in fact, the head-
quarters of a brigade of the 4th Infantry Division. 
Only through tedious questioning at a briefing did 
the spokesmen reluctantly admit that rather than a 
"night defensive position" the Communists had, in 
fact, assaulted a U.S. brigade headquarters. This 
would appear to be another clear case of deliberate 
omission in an attempt to play down significant 
enemy attacks (Fox, 1969). 
The 11 bureau chiefs further insisted that MACO! was deliberately 
withholding information, not for reasons of security but because the 
\ 
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release of such information would produce unfavorable publicity. 
Paradoxically, the U.S. Army Public Information Officer's Guide 
contains this statement governing the release of news: "The Army is 
accountable to every American for its actions. Therefore, it is the 
policy of the Department of the Army to make available to the public, 
either directly or through the various news media, all unclassified 
information of news value'F (Fox, 1969 ). 
The "Five O'Clock Follies" 
The credibility gap between the military and the correspondents 
seemed to broaden every afternoon after Vietnamese and American press 
corpsmen flocked into the Vietnamese Office of Information in Down-
town Saigon. There the press would listen to military and government 
spokesmen give briefings on the war's progress during that day. These 
briefings---termed the "five o'clock follies" by newsmen•••varied from 
15 minutes to two hours, depending on the business of the day. 
Most correspondents complained about these briefings, saying that 
all they were good for was to establish where the major activities 
took place that day. When the briefing officer was unable to provide 
details about certain operations, the newsmen often perceived this as 
further evasion. More likely than not, however, the officer giving 
the briefing was in the dark as to information other than that which 
he may have had in front of him. Like the cor(t'espondents in the 
audience, the briefing officer was not a witness to the activities 
about which he was speaking. The briefing officer may have been the 
second, third, or fourth in the connnunications chain of connnand. 
Brig. Gen. s. L.A. Marshall (U.S. Army, Ret.), a military 
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historian, author, and war correspondent, discussed the daily military 
briefings in an interview. General Marshall:(1970) assessed them as 
largely a waste of time: 
There is usually a spokesman for each of the services 
who tells what has happened in his ·.service that is 6f 
interest that day and, as I recall, there is also a 
civilian spokesman. I've only been to them two or three 
times because that is pretty much a waste of a corres-
pondent's time if he takes his work seriously. The 
sessions last for half an hour and there are questions 
of the speakers provided anyone is curious about some 
of the points raised. Now the beef is that these 
things are inaccurateoeothat they are just an exercise 
in nailing cranberry jelly against the wall and they 
are not specific enough;., But this is no worse in 
Vietnam than it is in any other war. It was just as 
bad in Korea. It was just as bad in World War II and 
in any theater you visited, because the fact of the 
matter is that the further you are removed from the 
fighting line, the mo~e inaccurate the information is. 
You see, it isn't because the higher levels want to 
gloss the thing over or want to make it look good. 
The news just doesn't get up there. 
All these differences have had a complex side effect, for they 
have raised questions about the credibility of the press as well as 
that of the administration. The alleged information gap really boils 
down to discrepancies between press reports and government reports on 
the progress and nature of the war. These in turn have focused atten• 
tion on the correspondents in Saigon. Their integrity, fairness and 
detachment have been seriously challenged. Surprisingly enough, some 
of the harshest criticism has come from the press corps itself. 
President Johnson had reservations about the Vietnam press coverage, 
especially on political developments. During the 1966 Vietnam elections, 
Johnson said he was "encouraged by the progress11 there but that he 
couldn't follow this progress "in the press as fully and in [as great] 
depth as I would like to." He added, "I have to go back and dig up 
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some of the cables from day to day, because the progress that the :. 
committee is making in the electoral developments is not as headline 
grabbing as some of the other distressing incidents" (Fritchey, 1967). 
Marshall's Criticism 
Still further criticism of correspondents came from Brig. Gen. 
Marshall, who stated that: 
Individual battles, ever the mainstream of the 
fighting story in Vietnam as in any other war, 
continue to be ignored solely because the 
majority of U.S. correspondents ••• don't give a 
damn about them. Perhaps the reporters are 
ignorant of war and do not wish to expose their 
innocence, or so fearful of the front that they 
cannot endure the thought of staying with it. 
The overwhelming majority of correspondents do 
not get to the front; and in that regard, at least, 
the American press continues ·.to be dere.lict in its 
main responsibility. The story of the'war is not 
being told in its daily columns; there we find 
only tangents and sidebars (Marshall, 1970). 
Marshall contended that the average correspondent 11 ••• prefers a 
piece that will make people on the home front squirm and agoµize ••• any 
demonstration or riot, especially a Buddhist demonstration•riot, is 
sure-fire copy •• •" 
General Marshall is known for his blunt and harsh indictment of 
war correspondents in Vietnam. Being an authoritative source, he has 
aroused strong feelings among the correspondents.:·_ .Some·:.Jaurnalists 
share Marshall's views, but there are those who do not. Wes Gallagher, 
general manager of the Associated Press, pointed out that the AP had 
more than 30 men in Saigon (in 1967), including 16 who rotated in the 
field with the troops. "Correspondents,tl Gallagher stated, "have 
covered both political and military developments, and every military~ 
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man and public leader has emphasized that wi~ning the political battle 
is at least half of winning the military battle in Vietnam" (Fritchey, 
1967). Robert Shaplen,of the~ Yor~er believes that war remains 
political and that it is proper that ·the riots and demonstrations be 
fully covered, not because they are "sure-fire copy" but because they 
are a vital part of the whole picture (Fritchey, 1967). 
The Impact of Pictures 
If this period can be said to have had a major highlight, a 
strong contender would be "The Burning of.the Village of Came Ne," 
filmed in 1965 by Morley Safer of CBS N~ws. U.S. Marines had received 
hostile fire from this __ village and in retaliation---after the Viet 
Cong had slipped away---leveled the l,50'!'."home hamlet. The camera 
showed Safer standing in ~rant o:f the byrning huts as he said, "The 
Viet Cong were long gone--the action woµnd~d three women, killed one 
baby, wounded one Marine and net_ted four qlq men as_prisoners. 11 When 
Walter Cronkite used the film, a fury ~rupted~ Critics said it was 
too realistic and that American soldiers should not be criticized. 2 
The military, :'however, has probably caused considerable damage to 
its own image'during the mid 1960s by the operation names,-µs~d for its 
combat patrdls. Titles such as 110peration Mashe:tf'and''Operation 
Hamburger'seemed to have a diverse effect on the American public. 
This was especially true when film was sent via satellite from Vietnam 
showing Vietnamese parents running from a burning cottage with children 
in their arms, or a newspaper picture showing a mother sobbing over a 
dead child with the operation title in the cutline. In this manner the 
25 
military, by its own hand, created dissonance and alienation in the 
American populace. 
Salisbury: Dateline Hanoi 
New fuel for the controversy came in 1966, when Harrison Salisbury, 
a senior editor-correspondent for the New York Times, filed a story 
from Hanoi which read: 
Contrary to the impression given by the United 
States conununiques, on-the-spot inspection 
indicates that American bombing has been inflic• 
ting considerable civilian casualties in Hanoi 
and its environs for some time past--there is 
damage attributed by officials here to raids, 
as close as 200 yards from the hotel~ 3 
Not only had Salisbury, the first U.S. correspondent granted a 
visa by the North Vietnamese, scored easily the biggest news beat of 
1966, but his dispatches, filled with detailed observations, directly 
contradicted much of the claimed success of the U.S. bombing program. 
The bombing had not always been pin-pointed on military targets; 
small villages had been reduced to ruins; bombs sometimes were dropped 
indiscriminately by fliers; and the bombing scarcely made a dent in the 
transportation and war-supplies capability of the North Vietnamese. In 
some sectors, the credibility of the press suffered (it should not 
use material favoring the enemy), but in the long run it was the 
Pentagon which received the sharpest blow. 
In 1967, General Thieu was elected president in South Vietnam and, 
with U.S. troop strength at 485,000 men, the administration was claim-
ing a victory. Journalists such as Joseph Alsop and Hanson w. Baldwin 
were assessing the North Vietnamese as badly hurt and incapable of 
winning. 
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But others in the profession saw a different score. Peter Arnett 
of the AP said General Westmoreland was "in a critical position.1\1 
Ward Just, Washington~ correspondent, said all the statistics re-
ported by the goverrunent gave a false picture of conditions, for the 
country was not pacified when you could not safely travel on its roads. 
R. w. Apple, Jr. of the New York Times said: '"Victory is not close at 
hand. It may be beyond reach. 11 Robert Shaplen, the New Yorker 
magazine's correspondent who is widely respected by both his colleagues 
and Washington observers, and Denis Warner of Reporter magazine added 
their estimates of what they considered to be the stalled effort in 
Vietnam (Minor, 1970). 
Saigon press corps members had not been off target in their 
assessments. When the Tet offensive of late January, 1968, occurred, 
the National Liberation Front assault on Saig6g,put the U.S. Embassy 
under seige, held the city of Hue for 25 days, -and wiped out most of 
the pacification program in the countryside. General Westmoreland 
asked and received an additional 25,000 troops from President Johnson, 
topping off at a total of 538,900. A reassessment of the Vietnam war 
policy had inevitably been set in motion. 
Press Corps Dissent 
There have been additional arguments both for and against the 
manner in which the war has been reported. What was startling to some, 
however, was how divided this far-away press corps itself had become. 
In Vietnam, the American correspondents were split in much the same 
way as the people back home. There were hawks~ doves and owls. While 
one might hope that most made an effort to be detached in their repor-
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ting, there was bound to be tension amidst such strong emotions. 
Undoubtedly the sharpest schism was over the military versus the 
nonmilitary aspects of the war. The veteran.:journalists who acquired 
valuable military experience in earlier wars seemed to like being with 
the troops, and there is little doubt that their dispatches have been 
distinguished by an understanding of the soldier in battle. Yet on the 
other hand, many of the younger correspondents have been absorbed in 
the intricate politics of the situationo They have come to know most 
of the ropes and their reporting often reveals shrewd insights. It 
seems that the argument over where the coverage should be need not 
trouble the American people, for it has been getting reports from all 
parts of the spectrum in Vietnamo Perh?ps, as Robert Shaplen has said, 
the American people have become confused due to such a mass coverage 
from so many different angles (Fritchey, 1967). 
Age Old Conflict: Censorship 
Conflict between the press and the government seems to know no 
season. It flourishes in peacetime as well as in war. The nature of 
the democratic system, with its conflict between the public's right to 
know, as represented by the press, and the government's duty to main-
tain national security, creates tensions. Yet when the government 
seeks to block the legitimate function of the press or when the press 
either distorts its own role or shirks its obligation, democracy faces 
serious perils. 
While there has been no formal military censorship in Vietnam, as 
there was in World War II, there has been expressed concern over security 
in the reporting of the war. The press has been asked to follow certain 
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rules of self-censorship. These guidelines pertain primarily to troop 
unit identification, locations and planned deployments. 
The absence of formal censorship has both good and bad points. 
On the one hand, it facilitates fast communication; on the other hand, 
it allows for misrepresentation. For example, a correspondent in the 
field may interview a few so.ldiers on the aftermath of a battle and 
file his storyo But the information obtained from these individuals 
may comprise just a minute portion of the entire operationo His article 
may be dispatched and in the news that evening, but it may misrepresent 
the particulai;- operation described, since it was not verifiedo By that 
time the initial impression on the public has already occurred. 
Correspondent Suspended 
A case that has been described as "one of the harshest disciplinary 
. 4 
actions ever taken against an American reportern- occurred on June 24, 
1968. John Carroll, a 26-year-old correspondent for the Baltimore~, 
broke the embargo and wrote a story on the evacuation of Khe Sanh. Due 
to Carroll's article, General Creighton w. Abrams, who had just taken 
over as U.S. Commander in Vietnam, suspended Carroll's press credentials. 
The case against Carroll was that he broke the military1 s embargo 
against the release of information on troop movements. Carroll argued 
that the purpose of the embargo on Khe Sahn " ••• was political, not 
military. Rather than have daily coverage of the abandonment, the 
military wanted to hold everything until it was over. Then they would 
5 have only one ba_d day in the press." 
Whether Carroll's suspension was justified is debatable. General 
Abrams contended that the embargo was to insure protection for hi:s men. 
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But to numerous correspondents, the suspension merely increased the 
already growing hostility between the pres~ and the military. 
,.,:"+ 
In some respects, voluntary censorship is more damaging and 
dangerous than overt government control. By definition it is more 
pervasive and insidious. For example, before censorship, ,was abolished 
in the Saigon newspapers, it was obvious that an item was deleted by 
a government censor due to the glaring white space. Censorship in 
Saigon now has become less open, for every newspaper operates "by 
anticipating governmental action against it, not only for content but 
also for tone and edit6rial direction" (Minor, 1970). 
In one instance, the Saigon Daily~, an English-language paper, 
was. closed by the government because it did not display a governmental 
announcement with sufficient prominence. Since the days of .President 
Diem, it has been the policy of the Saigon government to control news-
papers with an all-powerful hand, free to close them whenever something 
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is printed that is not to the authorities• t~ste.· 
(In the previous section, correspondents pointed out that one of· 
the principal reasons for conflict between reporters and the Diem 
government was the inability of the government to control the American 
correspondents. This led to mistrust and ai.1.oofness on the part of 
the Saigon government as well as on the part of the correspondents~) 
The few restrictions that have been imposed on correspondents came 
in 1965, when the United States began air strikes over North Vietnam. 
During that initial period, newsmen could not interview Air Force pilots 
unless escort officers were present. Pilot's who flew outside Vietnam 
could not be interviewed at all.v 
Restrictions such as these are necessary, says the Pentagon. 
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"The other morning," said a Pentagon press officer, "the bombers took 
off from Da Nang. Before they were over their targets--actually 12 
minutes after take-off--one of the wire services had the story on the 
wire. 118 
Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press, remarked 
that "AP correspondents, if given unfettered access to the Da Nang 
military complex, would be willing to submit all copy to formal U.S. 
h . 9 Army censors 1p." It is Gallagher's contention that the barring of 
correspo!}dents from free access to air bases and other military 
installations is clearly aimed not at security matters but at controlling 
what the American fighting men might say.lo 
Censorship and the American Serviceman 
American servicemen in South Vietnam depend mostly upon the 
Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) and Stars and Stripes for their news. 
In 1964, according to the late Jim Lucas, whose correspondence from 
Vietnam began in the closing days of French rule, servicemen were being 
told 11 eo .. next to nothing." He contended that "censorship apparently 
is based on the idea we can't risk offending ari eavesdropping audience 
of a million Vietnamese who understand some English .. " 
Barry Zorthian, who in 1964 was head of the U.S. Information 
Service (USIS) in Vietnam, called the AFRS ''the Cormnander• s and the 
Ambassador• s link with the American cormnunity.'' Zorthian said, "It 
must be maintained. The answer to the problem is not silence .. We 
know that. I hope the new system [a plan under which a key person 
rushes to the studio in emergencies and decides what goes on the air] 
works. If it doesn't, we'll try something else~ t(Lucas, 1967)• 
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A contrasting event occurred in early 1970 when a group of young 
service newsmen raised the specter of censorship. The charge was 
interference with the so-called McNamara Doctrine of 1967, in which the 
then Secretary of Defense emphasized that servicemen are entitled to 
the same unrestricted flow of information as all other citizens. The 
officers in charge of the Saigon Armed Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) 
claimed that the newsmen were confusing censorship with editing. This 
conflict was highlighted when Specialist 5th Class Robert Lawrence 
commented at the end of his regular telecast: "A newscaster at AFVN 
is not free to tell the truth." He added, ''We have been s:uppressed, 
11 
and I'm probably in trouble for telling you tonight the truth." 
Lawrence's charges were based upon his claim that film clips about 
racial disturbances in the United States had to be cleared with an 
officer. However, the film was aired, according to~ Saigon 
correspondent Burton Pines. Pines contended that the Military Assis-
tance Command Office of Information (MACO!) constantly harassed and 
meddled with AFVN news (MACO! is the immediate-supervisor of AFVN). 
More importantly, however, Pines stated that '.'when MACO! casts the same 
protective eye on news film supplied to AFVN by CBS and ABC••·film 
that has been shown in the United States•••it sometimes dents the 
M • ,.,12-cNamara Doctrine. 
The Vietnam War has posed many problems pertaining to the release 
of informatione Because of the American investment in manpower, money; 
and equipment, the public has a right to know the facts concerning 
American involvement in war.13 Therefore, the government is obligated 
to make the facts available. Because there has been no formal official 
imposition of censorship in South Vietnam, the question of censorship 
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has been left up to the individual corre~pondent and his employer. 
The restrictions that have occurred have, for the most part been few. 
Distortions 
While the correspondents have tolerated self-censorship, they 
cannot ignore distortions. Such distortions have marred government 
information policies on Vietnam for years. A few examples are apropos: 
(1) Early in the war, American correspondents reported that it 
was going badlyo They got their info::i;mation prfmarily from American 
military advisers in the field. Yet in October, 1963, Secretary of 
Defense Roberts. McNamara, fresh from a trip to Vietnam, announced 
that most American troops would be home by t4e end of 1965. 
(2) At the same time, the correspondents reported that the South 
Vietnamese hamlet fortification program was making no progress and that 
official statistics on these fortifications we.re exaggerated. Here, 
again, the press got its information fro~ America.n military advisers 
in the field and presUII1ably the White House and the Pentagon had the 
same sources. Yet the correspondents were assailed by officials 
(Raymond, 1966) .. 
(3) The handling of the 1966 Christmas cease-fire further rea 
inforced press skepticism of the official wordo Throughout the truce 
period, information officers in Saigon insisted there were no truce 
violat:j.ons. .·When the truce was over, on instructions from Washington, 
they released information of violations apparently known to them all the 
time (Raymond, 1966). 
Several correspondents have voiced their feelings regarding 
information officers as sources of information:14 
uMy experience has been that a good part of the 
information officers here really present a 
picture of Vietnam in pastel colors, which are 
very unreal." Dean Brel:i,s, NBC News. 
"An information officer is basically no 
different from any kind of press relations 
officer. It's our job to umnask him when 
he's lying, which they do." Malcolm Browne, 
free lance correspondent. 
11 ••• you have, in Saigon, a different kind of 
information officer, .who is more interested 
in policy than facts, and above all, is 
interested in the effect of stories. He's 
constantly worried about what the effect of 
a story will be rather than its accuracy~-
But I don't say that they constantly mis-
print things." Charles Mohr, New York Times. 
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(4) One of the most frequent complain~s throughout the war has 
dealt with the "body count" or "kill ration," which refers to the 
method of counting dead bodies of the enemy following a battle. South 
Vietnamese estimates of enemy dead were found to be grossly exaggerated. 
American estimates have been frequently que~tioned as well. 
In one incident, a military s~okesman reported that 90 enemy bodies 
had been counted hanging on barbed-wire fortifications. But a reporter 
who went to take pictures while the battle was still on was told by 
troops on the scene that there never had been bodies on the wire. In 
another instance, a reporter offered to show a·briefing officer a 
picture of a disabled Marine Co:i::ps tank that the officer said had not 
been knocked out (Raymond, 1966). 
The Investigations of My Lai 4 
Ironically, one of the biggest stories of the war in Vietnam 
escaped the American correspondents. This was the massacre of civilians 
at My Lai 4 on March 16, 1968, by U.S. Troops, for which Lt. William 
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Calley was convicted of murder in 1971 •. Despite the fact that military 
pictures were taken at the massacre site, and stories of the "Pinkville" 
affair were passed from G.I. to G.I., the news did not break until 
October, 1969, when Seymour M. Hersh, a free lance writer in Washington 
and former AP Pentagon correspondent, was tipped to the Army's inves• 
tigation of the atrocity (Hersh, 1972). 
Hersh's investigation revealed that the defense department, in 
order to avoid damaging pre-trial publicity, wo'l,!ld not release any of 
its material (20,000 pages of testimony and more than 500 documents) 
until the legal proceedings against the accused men had been completed. 
Army officials acknowledged that the process might take years. In 
addition, it was explained, when the materials were released they 
would have to be carefully censored, to insure that no material 
damaging to America's foreign policy or national security would be 
made available to other countries. 
After a period of 18 months, the Arrriy lifted the lid. Hersh was 
provided with transcripts of the investig~ting committee. After exam• 
ining the testimony and related documents, Hersh found that military 
officials had deliberately withheld important but embarassing infor-
mation about My Lai 4. Hersh (1972) said:· 
••• the Army has steadfastly refused to reveal how 
many civilians were killed by Charlie Company 
[Americal Division] on March 16, 1968--a de.cision 
that no longer has anything todo with pre-trial 
publicity, since the last court-martial [that of 
Col. Oran K. Henderson, the commanding officer of 
the 11th Brigade] has been concluded. Army spokes-
men have insisted that the information is not 
available. Yet in February, 1970, the Criminal 
Investigation Division, at the request of the 
Peers Commission [officially called the Department 
of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations 
into the My Lai Incident], secretly undertook a 
census of civilian casualties at My Lai 4 
and concluded that Charlie Company had slain 
347 Vietnamese men, women and children in 
My Lai 4 on March 16, 1968~-a total twice 
as large as had been publicly acknowledged, 
United States correspondents in Vietnam are provided with a 
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limited number of reliable news sources. There appears to be no par-
ticular place where newsmen can obtain complete and accurate accounts 
of what is happening. Correspondents must depend on a number of 
different kinds of information sources and their own observations and 
judgementsto,obtain a perspective on events. 
The news media have by .no means all been paragons of professional 
competence. They have been guilty of their share of inaccurate reports. 
It is important to recognize that many of the current difficulties 
in the press coverage of the war would exist even with formal censor-
ship. And it is important to recognize t,hat while the "crunch" between 
press and government is inevitable in American affairs, the hope of 
easing its consequences is dependant upon_tl;ie attitude of the 
government as upon the self-restraint of the press. 
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Wars, by their very nature, are difficult to cover. The war in 
Vietnam, however, presents unusual problems for the correspondent. 
11 ••• it is almost impossible to perform the reporting function of : 
reducing diversity to identity. All you can do is try to illustrate 
just how complex human, political and military relations are in this 
1 part of the world." 
Covering Wars: Yesterday and Today 
About 300 correspondents were accredited to headquarters in 
Saigon between 1966 and 1970 (Raymond, 1966). However, in mid-1964, 
there were only 20 foreign resident correspondents in Saigon (Brae-
strop, 1969). "No newspapermen can be very proud o~ the American 
press in this show," wrote Jim Lucas of the Scripps-Howard Alliance 
in 1966. "In the six months I lived in the Delta [in 1964] I was the 
only correspondent regularly assigned to--working and living with--
combat troops ••• this is the only war in recent memory which has not 
been covered to saturation" (Lucas, 1967 ). 
Tardy in dispatching more correspondents, the U.S. press seemed 
to do little to prepare them for their tour of duty in Vietnam. Peter 
Braestrup, who covered Vietnam for the New York Times in 1966 and 
1967 and was Saigon bureau chief for the Washington~ in 1968 and 
.... .., 
1969, sheds light on this situation. 
No American newsman, to my knowledge, spoke 
Vietnamese; none were sent to learn it prior 
to assignment to Vietnam. Nor were those men 
who lacked previous~contact with the military 
given an opportunity to brush up at Fort Bragg 
on the differences between a machine gun and 
a howitzer, battalians and regiments. No sports 
editor would permit a greenhorn to cover the 
World Serie~ without knowing baseball. We sent 
plenty of reporters to Vietnam who had never 
before been in uniform or out of the United 
States, let alone involved wi"th politics and 
conflict in the Third World (Braest~p, 1969). 
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Because of this lack of experience and preparation, the corres-
pondents sent to Vietnam appeared to rely heavily on (1) a handful 
of experienced Vietnam newsmen, most of them operating outside 
Saigon (i.e., Charles Mohr, Jim Lucas, Neil Sheehan, Mert Perry, 
Ward Just and Robert Shaplen); (2) the Embassy's political section; 
(3) a few Vietnamese politicians, and (4) Vietnamese stringers (Brae• 
st:ruip, 1969). 
In previous wars a correspondent knew where the likely action 
i 
was---at the front. He got his stories by following a unit to which 
he was assigned. On dull days he wrote features, but there was a 
geographic and quantitative coherence to the campaign and its battles. 
When territory was taken, cities capture, strongpoints demolished, 
casualties collected and prisoners rounded up, one could assess the 
degree of military success. 
Yet in the Vietnam War, not only are there no battle fronts, there 
are relatively few battles. The commitment of North Vietnamese Army 
units and terrorism of the Viet Cong has been designed in the main to 
harass the people and shake their confidence in governmental and mili-
tary security. Depsite the increasing number of military clashes, 
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most of the war has consisted of relatively smal~·scale attempts to 
counter Viet Cong propaganda, arson, kidnappings, terro+ raids, murders 
and various forms of sabotage. 
Correspondents refer to most of these with statistical sunnnaries. 
Thus, while they compete to cover the large-scale activities of the 
American combat forces, many of them are nagged by their consequent 
neglect of the wider role of the South Vietna~ese military and civil 
guard in coping with the enemy (Braestrap, !969). 
On a 1965 trip to Vietnam, Chicago Sun-Times Editorial Cartoonist 
Bill Mauldin, a former World War II Army sergeant famous for hi·s· 
Willie and Joe cartoons, quickly discovered.that war correspondence 
is not what it used to be. In World War II, said Mauldin, newsmen 
joined a com.bat unit, slogged along with the men, lived the com.bat 
life for weeks or even months. But Mauldin was the only correspon-
dent at Pleiku. "These boys," he said of the troops, "are sitting out 
there like outposts in Indian country-~visited only rarely by 
correspondents, who fly up from Saigon, stay a day or two and fly 
back again .. 112 
Yet in contrast to Mauldin1 s criticism, one correspondent stated: 
We realize that the canard exists that most 
reporters sit in Saigon and do not get out 
in the field. This is pure poppycoc~ and 
without support in fact. Most travel 
extensively and often, checki;ng facts for 
themselves. At any one time, probably one-
third to one-half of the press corps is in 
the boondocks• Indeed, the problem is more 
often that the correspondents are not keeping 
an eye on the overall situation in Saigon while 
roaming around the back country (Hagley, 1968). 
Of these correspondents who do not go to the field, U.S. military 
officials recommend they not carry arms; but field commanders often 
ask newsmen to carry weapons on hazardous operations. Said Charles 
Black of the Columbus (Georgia) Enquirer: 
When you operate with a small unit, it's not 
fair to be a burden. You have to carry your 
own chow, your own gear and your own weapon. 
If you don't you're a straphanger, a VIP. 
And when you're a VIP yot#..r.enever really one 3 
of the bunch, you never get that Pfc•s story. 
Chasing down stories in Saigon itself becomes so exasperating 
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that, for many of the press corps, a chance to go into the field with 
the troops comes as welcome relief. 
"It may sound corney," explained Los Angeles Times correspondent 
Jack Foisie, 1•but it• s refreshing to get out where people say what 
4 they mean." 
Bernard Fall, the distinguished historian of the Indochina War 
who was a 1967 casualty, believed that the correspondents in Vietnam 
were doing a one-dimensional reporting job. Fall granted that 
correspondents were diligent and courageous and that most of the 
reporting was fair and objective; yet in his view it lacked depth 
and breadth. "Most of the newsmen settle for reporting the battles, 
the blood and thunder, instead of the economic, social and polit.ical 
problems created by the war," Fall believed. His assessment that every-
body wanted to be "a junior Ernie Pyle and write about Joe Schmo from 
Kokomo" seems to many professional journalists an inaccurate view 
(Fall, 1968 ). 
The Correspondents View Their Work 
By mid 1960, a great many Vietnam correspondents agreed that there 
had been an overemphasis on day-to-day activities and that more time 
should be spent on background stories. But as difficult as it was for 
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correspondents to evaluate success or failure in jungle warfare---
primarily because relatively few newsmen understood tactics, or tried 
to learn--""'i.t was easier to explain and ·report than was pacification, 
politics or social reforms (Braestrup, 1969)~ 
One of the biggest frustrations of newsmen in Vietnam has been 
getting the story out of the country and back to their papers in the 
United States. Correspondents must live in two worlds of time: the 
foreign desk's and their own. This is exceedingly difficult in Saigon, 
which is 12 hours ahead of New Yorko And Saigon is the only place in 
the country from which to file news copy. If correspondents are 
fortunate they can get their copy off by 10:00 p.m. Saigon time---after 
putting in an investment of usually four or five 10-hour days for a 
single 800 word story (White, 1967). 
In many respects, a war correspondent occupies a precarious 
position while in the field with the troops. Like a soldier, he is 
dressed in Army fatigues. He moves with, in and about the troops. 
And in the midst of a fire-fight or ambush, he is subject to equal 
attention from the enemy's land mines, small arms fire and artillery 
barrages. 
Neil Sheehan, who went to Vietnam in April, 1972, for United Press 
Internationa;J, then later for the New York times in 1964, was instrumen-
tal in the 1971 publishing of the book Pentagon Papers. Sheehan wrote 
in 1966: 
There have been times, in the two and a half years 
of covering this war, when I have envied the soldier. 
The soldier is just as frightened as I am before he 
goes into battle, but the soldier has no choice. 
Whether he is afraid or not, and all sane men are 
afraid here, his superiors decide what he will doo 
He can only hope, as he climbs aboard a helicopter 
and takes off for some battlefield, that he will 
return alive. 
The correspondent, however, usually has a 
choice. No one will order him to expose 
himself to bullets. He himself must care-
fully weigh the risks against the magnitude 
of the story. Then, when he has made his 
decision, he must discipline his nerves and 
gamble his life for what he will be able to 
cable to New York a few hours later ••• un-
fortunately, a correspondent in Vietnam 
often cannot calculate the risks. There are 
no frontlines here and death is dispensed 
with a strange whimsicality. 
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The worst moments for a correspondent i_n Vietnam seem to be those 
just before the battle begins, when the fear is greatest. Once the 
action connnences a correspondent is usually too busy trying to keep 
his head down and compile material for his story to think about much 
else. R. w. Apple, Jr., hitched a ride on a medical evacuation heli-
copter.,with the assumption that it would probably---by its very nature 
•••take him where the action was. He found what he was looking for 
in an hour-long firefight. During these minutes, in which bullets 
were whizzing by his helmet, Apple did two unusual things: (1) he 
removed his watch and (2) recorded the names, ages and hometown 
addresses of the soldiers who were pinned down .. with him.. "After the 
shooting finally stopped, and I stood up, I almost lost my trousers. 
It took a moment or two to realize that a bullet had slit them down 
the back" (Apple, 1966). 
While there may be no inherent journalistic v~l~e in getting 
shot at•••and even less to be said for getting hit•••it is difficult 
to avoid, even if a journalist is trying hard to be cautious. But 
if the correspondent is doing his job in the field, it is almost 
impossible to avoid. When the Pleime Special Forces camp was under 
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seige, eight correspondents drew numbers out of a helmet to see who 
would occupy the two places on a medical evacuation heli~opter being 
sent in to pick up the wounded. Simon Dring of Reuters and Charles 
Mohr of the New York Times won. 
''You guys must be absolutely insane," said a gunner who knew 
how bad the ground fire at Pleime was. Mohr and Dring came into the 
camp at about 30 feet altitude at 100 knots downwind with tracer 
bullets following their trail all the way. It proved to be a good 
introduction, for over 2,000 rounds of enemy fire hit the Special 
Forces barracks during the three days the correspondents were there. 
Mohr pointed out that "no sensible reporter deludes himself that 
he is being heroic in this war. The heroics are reserved for the 
troops, who do not enjoy the supreme'. privHege that any reporter can 
exercise at any time. That is the chance to say, !I~d love to stay 
fellas, but I've got to get back to Saigon and file. tn5 
Covering the war in the field·--below battalian level---is danger-
ous work; but trying to cover the skirmishes in and around the cities 
is more dangerous and difficult than covering jungle warfare. 
A good example of the problems encountered in covering street 
action was in Danang in 1966 when Buddhist monks lured newsmen to the 
Tinh Hoi pagoda as hostages against a final attack by the Saigon 
government. 
George P. Hunt (1966), managing editor of Life, described the 
-
action in this way: 
Inside was sheer bedlam--troops, clusters of 
scared women and children, Buddhist boy scouts--
as machine gun and rifle fire broke all around 
the pagoda. Several reporters started back for 
the government lines. Now only shadows in the 
street, they held their hands in the air and 
·• 
yelled, mBao Chi, Bao Chi (press)! No 
shoot!" Then suddenly everything erupted. 
Up and down the street, from both sides, 
automatic weapons blasted away. From 
behind them came a rebel grenade which 
exploded in mid-air, felling photographer 
Tim Page [of Life] and two others ••• it 
was the second time Page had been wounded 
in 16 months in Vietnam. 
Two days later, Page was back in Saigon celebrating his 22nd 
birthday; but too late to attend the funeral service for his friend 
Sam Castan, Look magazine cor~espondent who was killed by a mortar 
blast three days earlier. 6 
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In 1968, the number of foreign correspondents killed in the war 
reached 17 when UPI photographer Charles Egleston, 23, was killed 
while covering South Vietnamese paratroopers in Saigon street fighting. 
As the fighting moved into Saigon and other cities at that time, corres-
pendents were in more danger than ever before. The week of May 10, 
1968, saw four correspondents lose their lives: ~. correspondent 
John Cartwell, 30; Michael Birch, 24, ··Australian Associated Press; 
Ronald Laramy, 31, Reuters; and Bruce Pigott, 23, assistant bureau 
chief of Reuters in Saigon. 7 
Street fighting was as new to most correspondents as it was to 
most of the soldiers. It is a different kind of fighting altogether..--
inevitably close in with the chances of getting caught in a crossfire 
immeasureably greatero What is secure at 9:00 a.m. may be hostile at 
10: 00 a.m. 
By now, most journalists can handle themselves 
fairly well in the field; they know when to duck, 
when to run, what to listen for, when to dig. 
In the cities, however, we forgot about ricochets 
and flying glass, ·about the ability of an enemy 
to pop out of a burning shack and then disappear. 
If you move too slowly, you get cut off from 
allied troops, and if you go too quickly, you 
suddenlt find yourself in the middle of it. 8 
Correspondents have gone on patrols, flown medical evacuation 
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helicopters into firefights, and followed troops through bullet-ridden 
cities. Many of their actions are te:rmed unwise, dangerous and ill· 
fated. [Th~ first American correspondent to· "die in Vietnam was 
Robert Capa in 1954. As of 1972, 51 other United States correspondents 
have died.] Yet it appears that these are the prerequisites for 
covering a war of this nature. 
The Female Correspondents 
Psychologists have claimed that women, when presented with hard• 
ships, are the stronger sex. Doctors have asserted that most :women 
are able to bear pain better than men and that they are less suscep-
tible to fear. During World War II, female correspondents such as 
Ma~y Welsh, Helen Kirkpatrick, Eve Curie, Marguerite Higgins, and 
Margaret Bourke-White set the tradition that anything the men could 
do, they could do as well or better (Reynolds, 1962). 
Whether the women correspondents have been newcomers or old hands, 
their presence in the field usually has been met with varied reactions 
both from the Gis and fellow correspondents (male). 
''You'll wear fatigues all the time," said a Marine company 
commander. ''We don't want women with legs down here." 
"Will you please just say something? I haven't heard an American 
woman speak in five months," begged a battle-weary Army sergeant. 
"It• s a delightful change to have them around," admitF-e-:Ci APt;s 
9 Peter Arnett .. 
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Perhaps the most famous and best loved of the female correspon-
dents was Georgette Louise "Dickey" Chapelle. A veteran in every sense 
of the word---World War II, Korea, Quemoy, Hungarian revolt, Lebanon, 
Cuba, Northeast India, Ladakl, Algeria, Laos, Dominican Republic---
she fell with six Marines on November 4, 1965, when her foot tripped 
a concealed nylon fishing line attached to a booby trap. At the age 
of 47 she became the first American woman correspondent to die in 
action. 
From 1935, when at the age of 16 she entered Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology on a scholarship, Dickey Chapelle became part 
of a man's world. She became a pilot, a parachutist, a combat photo-
grapher. She was not one to tolerate favors in the field because of 
her sex. She hid her figure in loose khakis. Her hair was kept up 
under an Australian bush hat. To keep in condition, and not to be 
a burden on the men she photographed and wrote about, she ran two miles 
a day when in New York between assignments -(Garrett, 1966). 
Two other female correspondents, Michele Ray and Kate Webb, also 
flirted with danger when they were captured by the Viet Cong. 
Michele Ray, a young French journalist for Le Nouvel Observateur 
and former!!.!!:, magazine cover girl, has been known for her daredevil 
operations. In order to film a documentary movie, the former House 
of Chanel model was captured while driving from Ca Mau, in the nation's 
southern tip, to the demilitarized zone in the north along 600 miles of 
ragged road and partly through Viet Cong territory. 
"They tied my arms behind my back, but they didn't know what to 
do with me, I think," Ray told reporters upon her release from 20 days 
in captivity. 111 kept saying 'Bao Chi' [press], the only Vietnamese 
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I know. 11 . 
Why didn't the Viet Cong simply t"elease her? "They told me ·'You 
are a guest, not a pt"isoner. We must make sure you are what you say 
10 you are. 111 
According to Ray, she was always t'reated as a guest, given anti• 
malarial and vitamin pills, fed a plain but adequate diet, given sheltet" 
and not mistreated. When she was released,,her luggage and money were 
retu;rned. 
But as glad as American officials were to have her back, they 
were still annoyed. There was some speculation that she had: !not 
fallen into VC hands, but had knowingly placed herself in a position 
where she was certain to be captured. "The Viet Cong knew who she was 
and they were smart,".said one official. "They used her to make 
propaganda capital. I might also point out that lives were probably 
lost as the result of her actions. The Vietnamese Army mounted oper-
. 11 
ations to hunt for her and there were ambushes.". 
Kate Webb, 27, from New Zealand, became United Pt"ess International 
bureau manager in the Cambodian capital of.Phnom Penh when Frank Frosch 
was slain in a Viet Cong ambush in October, 1970. In April, 1971, 
Kate Webb, together with a Japanese newst"eel photographer and four 
Cambodians (a newspaper cat"toonist, a photographer, and two driver-
interpreters), disappeared while covering a battle 56 miles southwest 
of Phnom Phen. 
It should be noted that while Michele Ray, Richard Dudman, 
Elizabeth Pond and Mike Morrow were travelling independently in enemy 
territory, Kate Webb was with a Cambodian army unit when the fighting 
that resulted in her separation broke out. 
As in the other cases, the Communists marched them over long 
distances and subjected them to interrc,gations and questionnaires. 
The questionnaire asked for details of our families, 
salaries, addresses and occupations of friends, 
biographies and details of our capture ••• The second 
section asked for our opinions of the war. I re• 
wrote from memory the last stories I had written for 
UPI on the military situation in C~mbodia. 
I found that day•long interrogation tough and 
worrying. It was hot. There was tea and ciga• 
rettes. It was interesting, and confusing: 
''Why were you following the ~on Nol troops?~'. 
''Why do you work for the American Imperialists?" 
"You cannot be a neutral observsr in this war. 
Everyone is on one side or the other." 
"We do not believe you put yours~lf in dangerous 
military situations·if you are not CIA. Why 
would you risk your. life if you were not?" .. (Webb, 1971) 
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In addition to Kate Webb, Dickey Chapelle and Michele Ray, Viet-
nam has seen scores of other girls in fatigues c~vering the war. 
They were [in 1966] mostly young and independent, with qualifications 
equal to or better than many of their maie competitors. In the 
f 11 . f - f h d "b. d b T · • 12 o owing, our o t ese women are escr:i. e y ~.magazine. 
Denby Fawcett, 25, fl Columbia University alumna, followed her 
boyfriend when he was sent to Vietnam by the Honolulu Advertiser. 
When he left Saigon, Fawcett stayed on to run the paper's bureau alone. 
When she was not covering political ·upheavals in the city, she was in 
the field with the troops. Once the sound of a not-too-near mortar 
shell prompted four Marines to fling themselves over her 11pt"otectively. 11 
Said the blue-eyed blonde: "They're always doing cute things like that 
in the field." 
Betsy Halstead at 24 was one of the youngest and yet most 
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experienced female correspondents in Vietnam. ·. ·A graduate of Temple 
University, she went to Vietnam in 1964 with her husband Dirck··•he 
to run UPI 1 s photography desk, she to report for the bureau. She was 
the first reporter to witness and photograph a B-52 raid, and was the 
first to interview the mayor of Danang after Premier Ky called him a 
Opmmunist and erroneously announced th~t he had fled the city. "I've 
learned to keep quiet and not to argue," said the 5'2" redhead. "You 
can always sweet-talk someone into doing something for you." 
Beverly Deepe, 30, became a free lance writer after the New York 
Herald Tribune ceased publication. She has logged more continuous 
time in Vietnam than any other correspondent. On her way around the 
world in 1962 she stopped off in Saigon and stayed. She developed 
valuable contacts with the Vietnamese. D~epe finds the biggest 
challenge as a woman correspondent :i,s that ttmost of the troops 
expect me to be a living symbol of the wives and ~weethearts they left 
at home. They expect me to be typically American, despite cold water 
instead of cold cream, fatigues instead of frocks. Always it;• s more 
important to wear lipstick than a pistol." 
Esther Clark, 46, has been covering military affairs since 1948, 
when she jetted through the sound barrier. Like most others, she has 
studiously resisted being toughened into "one of the guys.". She is in 
Vietnam because "I felt I had to try explaining to the people at home 
what is going on. 11 . To do this she based herself in Danang. "I detest 
Saigon," she explained. "The war seems so remote from there." She 
spends most of her time talking to the troops. "After five minutes,11 
she said, "they get the idea I'm not a greenhorn." 
so. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CAMBODIA: THE FREE-FOR-ALL 
On June 30, 1970, the last of 14,000 U.S. soldiers crossed back 
into South Vietnamese territory after spending 60 days in Cambodia. 
And, at a cost of 339 American casualties, questions arose as to whether 
or not it was really worth it all. 
Eq1.1alty in question was the loss of correspondents in the Cambodian 
operation. Out of 24 newsmen who were listed as either dead oi- missing, 
seven were Americans. 
Reporting the war in Vietnam always has been a dangerous and 
difficult assignment, as has been pointed out. But in May and June 
of 1970, it became riskier than ever before and far more confusing. 
Correspondents discovered that unlike Vietnam, where heavily travelled 
roads were usually well protected, the situation inside Cambodia was 
highly unpt'~dictable. Travelling in an area where U.S., South 
Vietnamese, Cambodian, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong u~lts were 
scattered about, no one knew from hour to hour whether a road was 
safe or not. Situations such as this make for captured correspondents. 
The first captured correspondents to return from the Cambodian 
war zone were Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, 
Richard Dudman, Washington bureau chief of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
and Mike Morrow of Dispatch News Service International. 
These three, who spent 40 days in captivity, were driving a 
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scout car 1:lP Route 1 from Saigon to the Cambodian village of Suay 
Rieng (near Phnom Peng) in order to get a 11 first-hand look at develop-
ments across the Cambodian border. 111 
At first their captors believed they were United States govern-
ment officials or CIA agents, and the three had to endure a harrowing 
day. In one town, they were taken from the. truck, blindfolded and 
marched through a gauntlet of jeering Cambodian villagers. Then, 
Dudman said, he and Morrow were ''tied to a motorbike, forced to run 
a half a mile still blindfolded, knocked to the ground with a blow on 
2 the head, and left in a darkened room. 11 
This treatment soon ended once their credentials were examined 
by an officer. From that point on they were treated as "good people" 
and friends by their captors, although they were kept constantly on 
the move, staying in the homes of ten different Gambodian villagers. 
At one point they were asked to tape-record (apparently for the so-
called Liberation Radio or Hanoi) statements about their experiences, 
b h fl h . 3 
"ut none tat con icted wit our own views.". 
The three reporters, each having be~n known to criticize United 
States military involvement in Indochina, were given a farewell party 
of sorts. ''We left the liberated zone [North Vietnamese-held area] of 
Cambodia as honored guests at a meeting of 1,000 villagers," Dudman 
said. "Speakers expressed their gratitude toward those American people 
who oppose aggression by the Nixon administration in Indochina. They 
asked us to write the truth about the situation in the front-held 
areas." 
4 
CBS correspondent George Syvertsen, pursuing an inclination that 
something was up on the road to Takeo, picked up Gerald Miller, a CBS 
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reporter-producer, and headed south, followed by a blue Mercedes 
containing another CBS crew. Syvertsen's jeep, which could have been 
mistaken for a military vehicle, came under Communist fire, went off 
the road, crashed into a tree and burned, hit most likely by a grenade. 
A badly maimed body found in a freshly dug grave near the jeep was 
identified later by a CBS newsman as Syvertsen's• ~iller and the 
other occupants of the jeep were presumed dead or taken captive. 
Those crewmen in the trailing Mercedes were-captured. 
Syvertsen, 37, a graduate of Columbia College and fluent in 
several languages, was known as an intelligent and thoughtful newsman. 
He had had more than two years of experience as a combat reporter in 
Vietnam, and consistently spent one out of three months in the war 
5 
zone. 
It appears that the reason for the soaring casualty rate among 
correspondents in Cambodia was that the geography of the conflict had 
broadened. Unlike the fighting in South Vietnam, where correspondents 
were briefed in Saigon and travelled in U.S. helicopters, the 
Cambodian operation put correspondents on their own, mainly on un-
secured roads in new areas of operations. 
One veteran newsman questioned whether roving about the Cambodian 
countryside was necessary at all. Yet in Cambodia there seemed ·::to '.;he 
some merit in covering the shooting war, if for no other reason than 
that it allowed newsmen to observe the performance of South Vietnamese 
troops. It also provided a base for the evaluation of the administra• 
tion•s Vietnamization program. The correspondents provided a system 
of check-and-balance by verifying the military•s discovery of caches 
of enemy arms and supplies. 
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No war can be covered without some danger to correspondents, and 
it seems that an enterprising combat reporter sometimes will incur 
additional risks on his own initiative. Such gambles became more 
frequent when correspondents were not allowed to fly into Cambodia with 
South Vietnamese troops. But on the death of Syvertsen and the dis-
appearance of another newsman from CBS, one from NBC, and five non-
Americans serving on camera crews, CBS News President Richards. Salant 
issued an order forbidding his network's newsmen from travelling on 
Id h . d · h ·1· 6 n oc ina roa s wit out mi itary escort. 
Ari:Ed±~or.~ Publisher editorial also called for rewarding 
discretion as well as valor by saying: 
The frustration of reporters "behind the lines" 
and unable to obtain information of what is happening 
at the fluid or non-existent front has been well 
documented as the reason why they have taken off 
on their own at great personal risk to get a story. 
We question this waste of brilliant manpower, 
however noble as it may be, and suggest that 
desk-bound editors at home issue orders stating 
that a story bottled up in the brain of a 
captured or dead correspondent7isn't worth the 
risk, or words to that effect. 
During an interview with Brig. Gen. s. L.A. Marshall (U.S. Army, 
Ret.) the writer asked him his feeling, as a former war correspondent 
and military officer, about the reporting during the Cambodian opera• 
tion. 
When the Cambodian thing blew open there were 
penetrations of different points along the 
frontier, so there's nothing .to keep a corres-
pondent from- g~tting iri 'a ;jec,.11, and·:barreling 
through--and getting into enemy country. This 
would seem a little unusual, but it's always 
this way in war. It was this way in Europe 
during World War II and in Korea when we were 
in movement. Any':tim.e a unit is in movement, 
if a person wants to dash out and get 
killed he can sure do it, because there's 
nobody to stop him and say, "This is the 
front line, don't go any farther." That 
is the reason so many of them get captured. 
They were just taking ridiculous chances. 
And in the case of these correspondents, they 
said they could not imagine themselves in an 
adversary situation. There's only one other 
relationship and that's a friendly one. Now 
that doesn't mean that they necessarily gave 
information that was worthwhile, but what it 
does say is that they should certainly have 
no reservation about doing so if th~y think of 
themselves as dealing with friends~(Marshall, 1970). 
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Richard Dudman (1970) one of the captured correspondents, offered 
a rebuttal to the reasoning of General Marshall and others of like 
mind in Columbia Journalism-Review: 
.. 
In covering several U.S. foreign_in~e~entions 
over the last sixteen years, I have come to· 
believe that a news correspondent must try to 
be a detached observer, a neutral who can report 
what he can learn about the aims and actions on 
both sides without the burden of thinking 11'we11 . 
and "they. 11 
The Indochina War is a classic case where the responsibilities 
of a correspondent go far beyond merely reporting "our".side as a 
special adjunct to the U.S. military forces. 
According to Dudman (1970), there are limits to what this kind 
of reporting can do to explain the war~ 
Of course, a reporter accompanying a military unit on an operation 
has to go by the rules. ,a.mt, ~ whether accompanying a military uni1;: or 
not, a reporter certainly should avoid writing anything that would 
breach military security, such as giving details on the makeup or 
position of u.s. forces while a battle is iri progress or disclosing 
that a plane has been shot down while there is still hope of rescuing 
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the crew. Beyond that, he takes on an unnecessary burden and is not 
doing his job properly if he feels bound to support current American 
policy and let himself be made, in effect, a public relations man for 
a group of American officials. 
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Television has found its niche as_ a dom.in~nt.•·if not predominant•• 
news medium for the Vietnam War. Through its screen comes an almost 
ceaseless blare of data that can immerse the viewer in an array of 
scenes :tanging from slain villagers and burning hamlets to wot.mded 
Gis and rescue operations. All this can create quite an indigestion, 
particularly since the prime viewing time is the 5:00-6:00 p.m. 
dinner hour. 
The television coverage may be disturbing to some, but a Hatris 
survey for Newsweek in 1967 found that most people have widespread 
confidence in what they see about Vietnam. Of those surveyed, 75 
percent expressed satisfaction with TV coverage and 17 percent found 
it unsatisfactory. 1 
Even with this high endorsement by the Rarris poll, TV has 
caused special problems to authorities. As with the adventurous 
print correspondents, television's cameramen have gone into battle 
wherever they could find it. 
In Vietnam, TV crews ride helicopters, slice through jungles and 
splash across rice paddies. They film anything they can hear or see: 
a Viet Cong mortar attack, an American search-and.destroy mission, 
a MIG losing its wing, a man losing his leg. 
And because the photographers followed the action, death struck 
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heavily in their ranks: Kyoichi Sawada of U~I, who was a 1966 Pulitzer 
winner for a picture of a Vietnamese family swimming together in a 
river current, was killed in 1970 in Cambodia; Larry Burrows of~, 
in Vietnam since 1962 and twice a Capa award winner, and Henri Huet, 
who had worked for both UPI and AP and had won a Capa award, died 
together covering the 1971 Laos invasion. UPI lost three other staff 
men: Hiramichi Mine, Kent Potter and Charles Egglerton. Bernard J. 
Kolenberg of AP and Dickey Chapelle of the National Observer died in 
1965 and Robert J. Ellison of Empire/Black Star was killed at Khesanh, 
(Emory, 1971). 
As with their journalist counterparts, television newsmen do not 
have a smooth time covering the war. Most of them are in Vietnam for 
only six-month tours of duty, which is hardly enough time to become 
aware of the situation. But this first war to be covered by television 
has been most perilous for the TV crews. To the men in the field, 
network managing editors in New York seem obsessed with asking for 
coverage of every bit of action. "Editors are so afraid of missing 
one story that to protect their flanks they have been asking us to 
risk getting our tails shot off11"2 "The trouble is," says Michael 
Arlen (1967), "Vietnam isn't a fast-breaking news event most of the 
time. The TV stations have their scheduled news broadcasts. The TV 
correspondents try to feed the stuff back·-~there's usually something 
to feed back, some of it technically useful, and now and then it's 
good; sometimes it's ridiculous---and a lot of chatter comes out of 
the picture tubes, but sometimes nothing really happens." 
Another difficulty is that television poses many inherent techno-
logical problems. As do print correspondents, l'V correspondents carry 
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their standard infantry pack while in the field. In addition, they must 
tote a tape recorder; the sound men lug some 20 pounds of amplifiers 
and other equipment; the photographers are burdened with close to 40 
pounds of cameras, batteries and film. On top of this they must keep 
pace with the troops. ~i~e filming the Gorrespondents• connnentary, 
the three must be linked by a cable less t-hal1 ten feet long, end to 
end, in order to synchronize the film. This in itself makes them a 
3 large target. 
Of the same 400 u.s. correspond~nts in .Vietnam at the peak of 
action in mid-1968, the Vietnam shooting war became the particular 
province of the news photographers and TV cameramen. On the three-
men teams, the cameraman is in most.constant dang~r. "A lot of guys 
take chances in covering this dirty, shifting war, but:the camera 
4 boys take the biggest chances and take them most often." 
The living legend of the TV troops is a wiry Vietnamese named 
Vo Huynh, 35, a native of Hanoi who mans a camera for NBC while his 
brother handles the sound equipment. Since he joined NBC in 1961, 
he has covered every major battle. ''You can't stay in one place like 
a reporter," he pointed out. "If you stay in one place, you get one 
picture. We have been very lucky. During a firefight, you can•t 
lie down and shoot. You have to sit up every so often for at least 
5 ten seconds." 
Peter Arnett and Horst Faas, both of the Associated Press, 
represented a curious double-threat before Arnett left Vietnam in 
1970 after spending eight years reporting and photographing the war. 
Since APs primary job is the day-to-day detailing of events, Arnett 
and Faas spept most of their time in the field; they saw more fighting 
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than the average GI. "A photographer has to be where the action is." 
According to James Burnham (1969), the Vietnamese War has been the 
first war produced for television. Michael Arlen (1967) emphasized 
that. 
For the most part, television in Vietnam 
has operated on a level not much more 
perceptive than that of a sort 6f:.il1ustra.ted 
wire service, with the television crews racketing 
around the countryside seeking to illustrate the 
various stories that are chalked on the assign-
ment board in Saigon, consta-:htly under pressure 
to feed the New York news programs news stories 
(ideally, combat stories), moving in here, 
moving out, moving in there the next day.· 
Television, of course, is no more guilty than any other news 
medium in seeking out the best stories. But compounded with the print 
newsman's battle for column inches of space, the TV correspondent is 
prodded by a more acute competition with expensive television diver-
tissement. Therefore, he specializes in brief scenes with tremendous 
emotional impact. Besides this, his very presence among the troops 
may be far more noticed than that of a print correspondent and may 
create news angles where none otherwise exist. As one reporter 
remarked: "Some persons will do things in front of a camera that 
they would not do in front of a pad an~ pencil" (Reynolds, 1966). 
According to James Burnham (1969), TV people have their own 
idea of what makes a good war: 
It must be able to keep ratings up. You've got 
to arrange your war for spectacle, action, and 
especially lots of human interest at the intellec-
tual and emotional level appropriate to TV--that 
is, the soap opera level. And what with the con-
temporary taste for that sort of thirg; you won't 
overlook plenty of horror, pain, blood, terror, 
and other sadistic-masochistic tidbits. 
Scenes such as the South Vietnamese police chief shooting a 
62 
non-uniformed Viet Cong guerilla without benefit of trials the Marine!~ 
deliberate burning of a South Vietnamese village; the killing of 
civilians in Hue while trying to evict Viet Cong snipers; and the 
iIIllllolution of Buddhist monks in the streets of Saigon.are indicative 
of some of the footage television has aired (Reynolds, 1967). 
In a 1966 National Educational Televison broadcast, "The 
Information War,"8.'four correspondents ·were interviewed on the problems 
they faced in reporting and evalu~ting the events of the Vietnam War. 
Malcolm Browne, free lance writer, formerly of the AP stated: 
I think that television has a tendency to produce 
the script around the footage that you have. If 
you have•-everybody likes to watch howitzers firing 
or machine guns, things of that sort, they like 
the spectacular shots .that illustrate the war in 
graphic, bloody terms, or whatever--and the 
correspondent is more or less duty-bound to build 
his speil around what's appearing on camera, which 
is perfectly all right, this is good television. 
Although American television correspondents can show this 
~'inhumanity" of the American side of the war freely, they cannot match 
these scenes with pictures of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
terrorism. Television can show the viewi~g public pathetic mothers 
running from a hut blasted by U.S. Forces, but it is unable to show 
any of the VC torturings and executions of village elders, school 
teachers and farmers. 
Television correspondents differ in one great respect from their 
print counterparts, in that they have the option of inserting some sort 
of verbal point of view by the manner in which they edge their voice.9 
Michael Arlen (1967) described this as a method in which the TV 
correspondent sharpens a topic and allows for a slight intrusion of 
irony. He asserted that:. 
If you show film of a combat situation, what 
you are really doing is adding another centimetre 
or millimeter to what is often no more than an 
illusion of American military progress. And to 
stand up there afterward [after battle], micro-
phone in hand, and say, with all the edge in your 
voice you can muster, asl [Morley] Saf~r used to do, 
"Another typical engagement in Vietnam ••• A couple 
of battalions of the Army went into these woods 
looking for the enemy. The enemy was gone. There 
was a little sniper fire at one moment; three of our 
men were hit, but not tbat seriously. It was pretty 
much the way it usually goes." [That] doesn't 
pull the picture back quite straight--or perhaps 
to be a bit more accurate, it focuses one's eyes 
on a picture that may not really have any useful 
connection with the situation it claims to be 
communicating about. 
Brig. Gen. s. L.A. Marshall (1970) offered these observations 
regarding television correspondents: 
There are people in the field who·want to get 
blood on the moon every night ••• you see, they 
want to get a shock story. And there are all 
kinds of stories that go begging over there, 
wonderful stories that they don•t want to look 
at simply because there is something constructive 
about it [sic]. The television-correspondents 
in the first place try to show how a war is going 
in two or three minutes of time. Well, you can't 
do that. You can just get a very small piece of 
what is happening when you are that limited, and 
since they have just those few minutes, what they 
want to do is make a big impact, and so they want 
a shocker, they want a grabber. It gets the whole 
thing out of focus. I'll give you a good example 
by the action of the press during the Viet Cong 
raid on Saigon [1968]. These were .. flea bites and 
absolutely unimportant. There was never any danger 
to the city and there was very little damage done. 
But this thing was played up by the television 
correspondents as if the city was really rocking and 
as if the populace was frightened to death. Absolute 
nonsense. 
John McLaughlin was in Saigon on August 18, 1968, when the 
Viet Gong conducted their rocket attacks on the city. McLaughlin 
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asserted that correspondent David Culhane of CBS described the early 
morning rocket attacks as "sounding like the whole world was coming 
apart," and that CBS cameras graphically recorded the strewn glass,. 
bricks, metal and sections of galvanized tin roofing blown off the 
parliament building. Tony Sargent of CBS reported on a Japanese 
correspondent who was killed by shrapnel. Commenting on that report 
McLaughlin said: 
The cameras drained from the scene all its living 
(and dying) color, relentlessly·fixing on the 
correspondent's oozing blood, a neighbor's curious 
face, a woman overcome with grief,. the doctor 
massaging the newsman's chest f~d, mercifully, the 
arrival of the jeep ambulance. 
According to McLaughlin, what Sargent did not stress was that the 
rocket that killed the newsman spent its fury on a garage, that only 
one person was killed, and that there were no serious injuries. What 
Culhane did not stress, McLaughlin said, was that the parliament 
building was not as seriously damaged as the edited footage suggested. 
Hy McLaughlin's standards, both Culhane•s and Sargent's reports 
left one with the impression that Saigon was paralyzed by the Viet 
Cong assault. 
''My point," said McLaughtin "is that they [Viet Cong shellings] 
must be seen in perspective ••• what the CBS_correspondents failed to 
do was relate these events in any meaningful way to the larger context 
11 
of the war." 
Another case in perspective is brougl).t out by Dale Minor (1970) 
in his book, .!h!:. Information!'!!.!.• It_occur~ed in 1968 in Hue, when a 
television crew remained with the unit in reserve and had it go through 
the motion of clearing a house. For the sake of pictorial realism the 
unit•••now 11hollywood Marines"---moved down a road and threw a smoke 
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grenade into the house. 
According to Minor, '~This staging is a vice common to every form 
of journalism ... but the vice seems more strongly:~motivated in television 
and is certainly more dangerous, be~ause of the medium's power and 
because it purpo~t.s -~o show reality, not just describe it.". 
/ "The television people work like hell in Vietnam""•Saturdays, 
Sundays, all the time. One can whoosh eight cans of 16mm film two-
thirds of the way around the world in less than twenty hours. For 
around seventy-five bucks, one can b~y thirty minutes• worth of 
satellite time and relay the film in from Tokyo" (Arlen, 1967). 
According to NBC•s New York-based Naws Operations Head, Bill 
Corrigan, the television correspondent is in action from the moment 
his plane touches down at Tan Sin Nhut Airport. The big trouble is 
that even a rotation system such as NBC•s--a stint working out of 
Danang, then equal time in Saigon--no longer affords a man any rest. 
"There's nowhere to hide anymore. There are no soft assignments. 1112 
Television has given the correspondent a new dimension 'for his 
work, even though he may not yet know enough to take full advantage 
of it. Perhaps the TV correspondents• most grievous fault in Vietnam 
has been the tendency to focus on the action and uproar in the fore-
ground and overlook the necessity for reporting on the ideas behind 
them. The situation could be imp~oved by loosening up and expanding 
the evening news programs so that correspondents could handle larger 
themes and pursue them in a more investigative method.(Hohenberg, 
1968; Arlen, 1967). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Surrnnary 
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the role of the 
war correspondent in South Vietnam. It was hoped that this thesis 
would provide some insight into the many facets of war reporting in 
Vietnam and shed some light on the problems the correspondents 
encountered as well as the procedures used to report the war. 
Findings on these matters were these: 
(1) In the early days of the Vietnam War (1951-60) American 
correspondents assigned there were sparce; newspapers relied chiefly 
on the French wire service for information about the war. Reporting 
methods during this period were l~x and ~orrespondents looked for 
sensational stories rather than puttfng_the war into context through 
in-depth reporting about the country, people and polttics. 
(2) When U.S. involvement began to build up between 1961 and 1964, 
a tough-minded band of journalists took it upon themselves to report 
the news, whether or not this news was palitable to Americai.s and their 
government. Leading the crusade were David Halberstam of the New York 
Times; Malcolm Browne and Peter Arnett of the Associated Press; Charles 
Mohr of the New York Times; and Francois Sully of Newsweek. Their 
reporting started a tug-of-war between the press, the military estab-
lishment and the u.s. administration which later produced what was 
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to be called a "credibility gap" for all parties involved. 
(3) The problems that began in the early 1960s grew in intensity 
from 1964 on. Even though correspondents.such as Halberstam and Browne 
were no longer filing from South Vietnam, there were some 400·k corres-
pondents in the country to take over where they left off. The crisis 
in credibility reached a new height between 1964-68 in the aftermath 
of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The correspondents were accused of 
not supplying the people with the facts on the true progress of the 
war; the administration was attacked by the correspondents for trying 
to supress information on everything from body .. count methods to mili-
tary activity; the correspondents were regarded as a nuisance---and a 
threat---to the South Vietnamese government and often to high ranking 
u.s. Army officers as well; and the military in turn was criticized for 
attempting to give a false picture of the war. 
(4) Correspondents on the whole had no knowledge of the Vietnamese 
language, save a few essential words or phrases. Nor was any real 
attempt made by them or their employers to engage in an adequate 
orientation program--·if any at all·--prior to assignment. 
(5) Many correspondents had never served in the armed forces and 
were sorely lacking in an understanding of military procedures. 
(6) There have been few battle fronts in Vietnam; the war could 
be in Saigon one day and in a distant village the next. To assist 
correspondents in covering the war, the Army has allowed them to hitch 
rides in military transports and helicopters. In effect, the press 
* This estimate also has been set at 250 and 300. The writer of this 
thesis believes 400 to be the most accurate estimate. 
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card was a free transportation ticket. The correspondents have been 
criticized by the military as well as some colleagues for not going 
into the field with the troops. The contention is that too many re-
porters have remained in Saigon where they have received their infor-
mation solely from the daily briefings and secondary sources. 
(7) Others have countered this by saying that the correspondents 
frequently have gone to the field with the troops. They assert that 
there has been too much bloodGand-guts coverage and not enough economic, 
social and political reporting. 
(8) While war coverage is still a man's job, several women 
correspondents have made their presence known on the scene. 
(9) The Cambodian in~ervention in late June, 1970, saw 24 newsmen 
listed as dead or missing, seven of whom were Americans. The reason 
for such staggering losses in only a 60-day period was primarily the 
manner in which the correspondents tried to cover the action. At the 
outset of the intervention, reporter~ denied on this occasion permission 
to fly in with South Vietnamese troops, took to the road. Of those 
captured or killed, none was accompanying a specific military unit; all 
were travelling about Cambodia in jeeps or cars trying to find a story. 
(10) Actions such as this received harsh criticism, yet coverage. 
on the shooting war in this instance also was seen as an opportunity 
to observe the performance of the South Vietnamese Army and to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Vietnamization program. 
(11) Television has been the dominant news medium in the coverage 
of the Vietnam War. 
(12) Television has special difficulties, for its correspondents 
must carry heavy recording and camera equipment while in the field and 
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at the same time keep pace with the troops. Because of this, they are 
larger targets than other reporters, and have taken a greater loss of 
life than have their print counterparts. 
(13) Television has brought scenes of tremendous impact into 
homes across the nation, but has been criticized for this blood-and-
thunder treatment and admonished for not going into enough depth on 
Vietnam and its problems. 
Conclusions 
Based upon the detailed information this writer has studied in 
the preparation of this thesis, the following conclusions are made 
about the war correspondent in Vietnam: 
(1) There were too few correspondents in Vietnam early in the 
war when political and military foundations were being established. 
(2) In general, correspondents in Vietnam have been ill-prepared 
for the assignment. They have lacked the proper background upon which 
to base their reports and over the course of the war have spent too 
little time dealing with the social, cultural and political dimensions. 
(3) Not enough newspaper space has been allocated for in-depth 
reporting .. Too much attention has been given the "blood-and-guts" 
coverage. 
(4) The attitude of both government and military officials has 
been negative towards the press throughout the war. Correspondents 
have too often lacked reliable sources upon which to base their 
accounts. 
(5) Saigon government officials, unable to exert control over the 
correspondents, held themselves aloof and at a distance. No friendly 
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or even workable relationship existed. 
(6) Except for a few ''specials," television failed to present in-
depth stories. Too much of the coverage was routine without adequate 
background information. 
(7) The correspondents, while they have not been without fault, 
should not bear sole responsibility for the failure ~o present the 
Vietnam complexities in a more understandable manner. The military, 
United States government and Saigon government must share this 
responsibility, for they too were an integral part in the credibility 
gap. 
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